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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] A virtual environment is a presentation of a virtual world to a real 
person, as if the person were virtual and in that world.1  The most 
ubiquitous examples today of virtual environments are multiplayer online 
games such as World of Warcraft2 and Project Entropia.3  These games 
provide thousands of users from all over the real world with persistent 
virtual worlds and consistent personal representation in the virtual world 
in the form of characters.  The characters interact with each other within 
the virtual world.  In fact, players spend ten hours per week building up 
the strength and abilities of their characters.4  This process is called 
“leveling up.”5  The higher the player’s level, the better the player is at 
battling other characters and monsters, casting spells, flying spaceships, 
                                                          
* Michael Meehan holds a Ph.D. in computer science and his research areas include 
computer graphics, virtual environments, and multiuser systems. Dr. Meehan expects to 
receive his J.D. from Stanford University in May 2007.  Dr. Meehan would like to 
acknowledge the contributions of Barbara Fried, Thomas Grey, Richard Craswell, and the 
students in the Stanford Law School Legal Studies Workshop.  Without all of you, this 
project could not have been completed. 
1 Hal Berghel, Virtual Reality is Virtually Here, CYBERNAUTICA, Jan.-Feb. 1997, 
http://berghel.net/col-edit/cybernautica/jan-feb97/pcai_97a.php. 
2 World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
3 Entropia Universe, http://www.entropiauniverse.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
4 Lev Grossman, Bloody Ethics, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 9-15, 2000 (“The average ‘citizen’ 
spends between 17 and 20 hours a week playing Ultima [Online], and more than half log 
on every single day.”), available at 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0006,grossman,12395,8.html. 
5 See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.com (search “leveling up”) (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
2 
etc.  Additionally, different areas of the virtual world presented in the 
game may be accessible only to players whose characters have attained a 
certain level.6 
 
[2] As the players navigate their characters through the virtual world and 
battle monsters, aliens, or other players, they can acquire or create in-game 
assets or “virtual property.”  Often, when a monster is killed, treasure in 
the form of virtual property is left on the corpse.7  In other cases, 
performing certain tasks or completing certain missions results in the 
acquisition of virtual property.8  These in-game assets can include virtual 
currency, virtual armor to help protect the characters from attacks by other 
characters, virtual weapons to help inflict damage on enemies, enchanted 
virtual items to make the characters stronger, virtual real estate to raise the 
status of the characters and possibly provide them with a source of virtual 
currency,9 or any other virtual item that may be an asset to the user’s 
character.10 
 
[3] Another form of virtual property is a player’s game account.  This 
account provides the player with the right and ability to play particular 
game characters.11  When a game player sells a character account, the 
player is usually selling the password to the account, thereby allowing the 
purchaser to play the character and take ownership of any virtual property 
associated with the character.12 
                                                          
6 See id. 
7 World of Warcraft: Parties, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/parties.html. 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
8 World of Warcraft: Quest Basics, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/questbasics.html. (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
9 See Secondlife: The Marketplace, http://secondlife.com/whatis/marketplace.php (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2006).  See generally Entropia Universe, supra note 3. 
10 See Entropia Universe: Apply for Account §§ 6-7, 
https://account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/5185.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006); 
World of Warcraft: Item Basics, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/items/basics.html 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006).   
11 See Mike Musgrove, Virtual Games Create a Real World Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 
17, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/16/AR2005091602083.html. 
12 See id. 
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[4] Sales of virtual property happen daily and are often made via eBay or 
other online auction sites.13  Character accounts regularly sell for hundreds 
of dollars.14  Thus, players are willing to pay hundreds of dollars to enter 
the game with a character account that would otherwise take much time to 
develop.  Rare virtual items regularly sell for tens to hundreds of dollars.15  
Virtual real estate is often the most expensive.  In the game Project 
Entropia, a virtual island sold for over $26,00016 and a virtual space 
station sold for $100,000.17  Some of these sales are made by regular game 
                                                          
13 After a real-world sale on eBay or elsewhere, the game players transfer the virtual 
items between their characters.  The transfers are often negotiated via the game’s text 
chat or an offline instant message or email system.  Once an agreement has been reached, 
items are traded between the characters within the game.  During the trade, a graphical 
trade confirmation interface appears on each game player’s computer, displaying what 
each side is willing to give to the other.  The appearance of the items in the trade window 
lets players be sure of exactly what they are giving and receiving. See World of Warcraft: 
Trading, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/trading.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006).  For example, if a player buys a virtual sword via eBay, then she will arrange for a 
“virtual meeting” with the seller’s character in order to receive the virtual sword from the 
seller.  In World of Warcraft, there is also a “mail” service with which sellers can “mail” 
some virtual items and thereby obviate the need for a virtual meeting of players’ 
respective characters.  World of Warcraft: Mail, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/mail.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).  If the 
seller is the game company itself, the company simply places bits representing the virtual 
property in the game player’s virtual inventory.  Edward Castronova estimated in 
December of 2001 that the average per capita yearly income of game players in the game 
Everquest was about 180,000 Norrathian Platinum Pieces, which, at the time, was 
equivalent to about $2,266. This income made Norrath the 77th richest country in the 
world.  Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society 
on the Cyberian Frontier 31-32, 33 (CESifo Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=294828. 
14 At the time of this writing, on eBay, one World of Warcraft character account had 
already been bid to over $1,000 and numerous others had been bid to over $600.  See 
Ebay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
15 At the time of this writing, on eBay, a “Godly Crystalline Sword” in the game Guild 
Wars was on sale for $50 and World of Warcraft in-game currency was selling at a rate 
of approximately 20-25 virtual gold per U.S. dollar, depending on the amount purchased. 
Id. 
16 Gamer Buys $26,500 Virtual Land, BBC News, Dec. 17, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4104731.stm. 
17 Gamer Buys Virtual Space Station, BBC News, Oct. 25, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4374610.stm. 
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players,18 while other sales are made by the game company itself.19  Yet 
other sales are made by gaming sweatshops that pay workers, often in 
poor countries, to play online games for eighty or more hours per week.20  
In playing the games, the sweatshop workers create powerful characters 
and collect virtual property.  The sweatshop owners then sell this virtual 
property on the open market.21  In all of these sales, a player spends real 
money to purchase virtual property in order to gain prestige or competitive 
advantage in the game or simply to have more fun playing.22 
 
[5] What, however, are purchasers of virtual property getting for their 
money?  Consider the purchase of the virtual space station for $100,000.  
What would happen if the computer went down, the game company went 
out of business, the land map was upgraded (i.e., the game was changed in 
a way that deleted the virtual space station), the game was reset, or there 
was a bug, hack, or glitch in the system that caused the virtual property to 
be lost or rendered worthless?  Are there, or should there be, default rules 
to govern virtual property?  This paper will examine these questions.  
Section I describes various kinds of virtual property.  Section II discusses 
the uncertain default rules for the protection of virtual property.  Section 
III explores how virtual property should be conceptualized.  Section IV 
proposes default legal rules for virtual property that are based on the 
realities of the underlying technology and the reasonable expectations of 
game players and game companies. 
 
[6] It should be noted that the discussion herein of the legal rights and 
duties related to virtual property draws from the “seamless web of law,”23 
                                                          
18 Though perhaps not a “regular” game player, writer Julian Dibbell spent one year as a 
real-money businessman in the game Ulitma Online.  See Daniel Terdiman, Virtual 
Trader Barely Misses Goal, WIRED, Apr. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,63083,00.html.  
19 See Wikipedia, supra note 5 (search “Entropia Universe”). 
20 David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource It To Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, 
available at   
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/technology/09gaming.html?ex=1291784400&en=a
723d0f8592dff2e&ei=5090.  According to the article, the workers get paid less than $1 
per hour and play games 12 hours per day 7 days per week.  
21 Id.   
22 Id. 
23 Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1989). 
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and the theories that explain and expand that web.  This paper draws from 
what those areas of law termed “property law” and “contract law.”  The 
terminology in this paper, however, is drawn less from the broad expanse 
of the “seamless web of life”24 from the realm of physical property (e.g., 
“owning” or “destroying” virtual property).  Although discussion of 
virtual property lends itself to the use of physical property terms, this does 
not mean that the rights discussed herein should necessarily be considered 
property rights.  Notwithstanding, as noted by Thomas Grey, property law 
has moved from a discussion of “things that are owned by persons” to a 
fragmentation of property rights into “bundle[s] of rights” and an 
“eliminat[ion of] any necessary connection between property rights and 
things.”25 The rights and duties discussed and proposed herein might be 
more appropriately categorized as contractual duties between the game 
companies and game players than property laws relating the game 
companies and game players to virtual property.  Little may turn, however, 
on how virtual property rights are classified.  Given that the law is a 
seamless web, and is not always easily delineated along the lines of 
property and contract, a court might rely directly or analogically on 
property law, contract law, or other areas of law to address the issues that 
will arise with respect to virtual property. 
 
II.  VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
 
[7] There are many computer programs that could be considered virtual 
environments.  Not all of these will lead to the creation of virtual property, 
at least not the type that is discussed herein.  First consider creation 
software.  For example, with Form Z, an architectural design program, one 
can design buildings.26  With AutoCAD, a computer-aided design 
program, one can design engines, machines, and other devices.27  With 
                                                          
24 Frederick Schauer, 1985 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: VIII. Legal Practice and 
Profession, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1985). 
25 THOMAS C. GREY, Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69-85 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1980), reprinted in A PROPERTY 
ANTHOLOGY 534-42, 534 (Richard H. Chused, ed. 1997). 
26 See Form Z Products, http://www.formz.com/Products.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
27 See AutoCAD, 
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/index?siteID=123112&id=2704278 (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2006).  
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Adobe Photoshop, one can create 2D images.28  With Microsoft Word, one 
can create documents and stories.29  Each of these programs allows users 
to create property that is represented electronically.  The items created are 
covered by well understood laws, for example a copyright can protect a 
building design.30  The machines made in AutoCAD can be protected with 
patents.31  The images made in Adobe Photoshop can be protected with 
trademark or copyright.32  The documents written in Microsoft Word can 
be protected by copyright,33 or a more limited license.34  Given that these 
items are represented electronically, one might consider these forms of 
electronically represented property as “virtual property” although these 
will not be treated in this paper. 
 
[8] A second type of virtual property, that which will be considered in this 
paper, is anything that is “owned” in a multi-user online game.  This can 
include character accounts and in-game assets such as virtual currency, 
virtual weapons, and virtual real estate.35  Though this type of virtual 
property exists whether or not the player attaches any value to the 
property, the discussion in this paper will focus on those situations in 
which the virtual property is valued by the player.  The reason for this 
focus is that issues of rights to virtual property are likely to arise only if 
the player values it.  The most common indication that virtual property is 
valued is that a market for virtual property develops. 
 
                                                          
28 See Adobe Photoshop, http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshop/main.html (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
29 See Microsoft Office Online Homepage, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
30 See Rashida Y.V. MacMurray, Trademarks or Copyrights: Which Intellectual Property 
Right Affords its Owner the Greatest Protection of Architectural Ingenuity?, 3 NW. J. 
TECH.  & INTELL. PROP. 111, 2 (Spring 2005). 
31 See General Information Concerning Patents, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
32 See id.  
33 See id.  
34 See Creative Commons: Choosing a License, 
http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
35 See Mark Wallace, The Game is Virtual. The Profit is Real., N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2005, available at 2005 WL 8515571. 
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[9] A market for virtual property is likely to arise only if the virtual 
environment (or game) is persistent and multi-user and the virtual property 
is persistent and non-replicable.  In order for virtual property to be 
persistent, the game must be persistent. When a person plays a non-
persistent, multi-user game such as ID Software’s Quake series,36 she may 
find a virtual gun in the game.  The weapon is no doubt valuable within 
the game as it allows the player to perform the object of the game—
shooting other players.  When the game ends or is restarted, however, the 
player restarts play without the virtual gun.  The weapon’s lack of 
persistence results in the lack of a market for any particular instance of the 
virtual gun.37  Whether or not the ownership of the ephemeral virtual gun 
should be protected by law is unlikely to be litigated.  A player’s loss of a 
virtual gun in Quake due to an error in the game, for example, will be of 
limited importance once the game has restarted.  Though this paper will 
deal with the case in which ownership of virtual property is persistent, the 
discussion herein may also be applicable to situations in which the virtual 
property is ephemeral, as in the Quake example. 
 
[10] A game must typically be multi-user in order for a market for virtual 
property to form.  Yet, there are single-user games in which virtual 
property exists.  In many console games, such as Rockstar Games’ Vice 
City, 38 items collected in the game can be stored for long periods of time 
on memory cards in the game console.  The player may find a virtual car 
or weapon in the game.  The ownership of this virtual property is stored 
but, since the game is single-user, the virtual property cannot be sold 
among players.39  Though the ideas in this paper might be applicable to 
                                                          
36 See ID Software: Quake, http://www.idsoftware.com/games/quake/quake (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2006). 
37 Whereas one could imagine players paying some amount each time the game is 
restarted in order to start the particular session of the game in possession of the virtual 
gun, it would be hard to believe a market would form based on player X finding the 
virtual weapon and selling it to player Y before the particular session of the game ends, 
which will often be after tens of minutes. Quake II: Capture the Flag User Manual, 
http://q2ctf.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2006) (stating that “the default is a twenty minute 
match”).  
38 See Rockstar Games: Grand Theft Auto Vice City, 
http://www.rockstargames.com/vicecity (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
39 One could, however, sell the memory card on which the ownership and character 
information is stored.  I have never found such sales. 
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such types of virtual property, the discussion will be limited to those 
scenarios in which virtual property is alienable or assignable among 
players’ characters within the game, as transactions around such items 
represent much of the market for virtual property. 
 
[11] Markets will typically form only if the virtual property is non-
replicable.  Consider, for example, a virtual sword in a persistent, multi-
user game.  If the sword is particularly powerful, then other users will 
want to obtain the sword from the owner.  If the other players were, for 
example, able to “right-click” their cursors over the virtual sword and 
select “make me a copy of the sword,” thereby making a copy of the 
sword for free, then no one would buy the sword from the original owner.  
On the other hand, if the virtual sword is not freely replicable then a 
market might form for the sword.40  Markets around non-replicable virtual 
property have formed in World of Warcraft and other games.41  A virtual 
property market may form where: games provide for alienation of virtual 
property, the virtual property persists over time, there are multiple users 
available to create a market for the property, and the virtual property is not 
freely replicable.  The issues surrounding such virtual property are the 
focus of this paper. 
 
III.  THE UNCERTAIN DEFAULT RULES FOR VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
 
A. VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
 
                                                          
40 Strictly speaking, markets should form if the virtual property is not freely replicable, 
unlike the sword described in the example above.  If property is replicable in a controlled 
manner, then a market may still be created around it.  For example, if the owner of the 
virtual sword in the example could keep ten copies of the sword in circulation, then the 
virtual sword would be “replicable,” but a market could form around the alienation of the 
ten copies of the sword. 
41 For example, as this was being written, a virtual sword for sale on eBay had been bid 
up to $50.  See supra note 14. See generally Musgrove, supra note 11 (describing the 
real-world economy created by online role-playing games). 
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[12] Users of online games typically sign End-User License Agreements 
(“EULAs”) in order to gain access to the games.42  EULAs often deny 
players any ownership interest in virtual property and allow for arbitrary 
termination of players’ accounts.  For example, the EULA of Project 
Entropia has an ownership clause by which game players forego all rights 
to virtual property43 and a termination clause that allows MindArk to 
terminate a character’s account arbitrarily.44  The EULA for World of 
Warcraft has similarly harsh ownership and termination clauses.45  
 
[13] Consider the implications of the EULA in the recent $100,000 virtual 
real estate sale in the game Project Entropia.  The maker of Project 
                                                          
42 Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 64-65 
(2004-2005). 
43 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7 (stating that “all virtual 
items are part of the System and MindArk retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts 
including, but not limited to Avatars and Virtual Items; these retained rights include, 
without limitation, patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret and other proprietary rights 
throughout the world.  As part of your interactions with the System, you may acquire, 
create, design, or modify Virtual Items, but you agree that you will not gain any 
ownership interest whatsoever in any Virtual Item, and you hereby assign to MindArk all 
of your rights, title and interest in any such Virtual Item.”). 
44 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6, Account Inactivity and 
Account Termination (stating that “MindArk may terminate this Agreement upon notice 
to Participant.  Such termination may be made without reason . . . .”).   
45 Throughout this paper, Project Entropia and Mr. Jacobs are used as examples.  As 
noted above, the EULA for Project Entropia is representative of the EULAs for at least 
some other online games.  Compare, for example, the termination and virtual property 
clauses of the World of Warcraft.  Blizzard Entertainment, the maker of World of 
Warcraft, “reserves the right to terminate this Agreement without notice, if, in Blizzard 
Entertainments sole and absolute discretion, you fail to comply with any terms contained 
in these Terms of Use or the World of Warcraft EULA.”  World of Warcraft: Terms of 
Use, https://signup.worldofwarcraft.com/agreement.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).  
Read literally, this may effectively allow at will termination at will by Blizzard 
Entertainment, given that its sole and absolute discretion may not be challenged.  
Furthermore, the ownership clause for World of Warcraft reads: “[N]o one has the right 
to ‘sell’ Blizzard Entertainments content, except Blizzard Entertainment! So Blizzard 
Entertainment does not recognize any property claims outside of World of Warcraft or 
the purported sale, gift or trade in the ‘real world’ of anything related to World of 
Warcraft. Accordingly, you may not sell items for ‘real’ money or exchange items 
outside of World of Warcraft.”  World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, 
https://signup.worldofwarcraft.com/agreement.html.  At a high level, this has the same 
effect as Project Entropia’s ownership clause: eliminating any virtual property rights of 
game players. 
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Entropia, MindArk, sold a virtual space resort located in the “treacherous 
but Mineral Rich Paradise V Asteroid Belt.”46  The space resort provides 
the purchaser with 1,000 virtual apartment deeds, 100 virtual store deeds 
in a virtual shopping mall, taxation rights, land management, event 
management, marketing management systems, and a landing point for new 
characters.47  The space resort was originally set for a $0.10 starting price 
with a pre-auction buyout price of $100,000.48  Within a few days of the 
announcement, the buyout price was met by Jon Jacobs, an independent 
filmmaker whose character in Project Entropia is called “NeverDie.”49   
 
[14] What did Mr. Jacobs purchase?  According to the EULA, “MindArk 
retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts including, but not limited to 
[Characters] and Virtual Items . . . .” 50  The contract further reads: 
 
As part of your interactions with [Project Entropia], you 
may acquire, create, design, or modify Virtual Items, but 
you agree that you will not gain any ownership interest 
whatsoever in any Virtual Item, and you hereby assign to 
                                                          
46 Posting of Dan Hunter to Terra Nova, 
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2005/10/the_winner_and_.html (Oct. 25, 2005).  
MindArk, the maker of Project Entropia, allows people to play its game for free and sells 
in-game currency for real money.  Once in the game, players can create wealth by killing 
monsters and retrieving treasure from the corpses worth pennies or tens of cents.  Some 
of the treasures on the monsters’ corpses, however, are worth the equivalent of over 
$1,000.  See About: Hunting Guide, http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5115.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).  The wealth that a player has in the game can be converted 
into real-world currency for a 1.5% fee.  See Withdrawals: Bank Withdrawal, 
http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5675.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006); Screen 
shot of Withdrawal (on file with author).  
47 New arrivals, or “newbs,” can choose to start their experience in the virtual world of 
Project Entropia at the space resort.  The advantage for the space resort owner of hosting 
new arrivals is that the new arrivals will invariably spend in-game money, thereby 
increasing the wealth of the space station owner.  Geoff Duncan, Psst! Buddy! Wanna 
Buy a Space Station? DIGITAL TRENDS NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005, 
http://news.digitaltrends.com/article8658.html.  
48 Id.  
49 Daniel Terdiman, Man Pays $100,000 for Virtual Resort, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 11, 
2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1043_3-5945248.html?tag=st.util.print. 
50 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7.   
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MindArk all of your rights, title and interest in any such 
Virtual Item.51  
 
If MindArk retains all rights to all virtual items, including the space 
station, then what did the company sell to Mr. Jacobs for $100,000?  One 
may argue that MindArk sold the right for Mr. Jacobs to “play space resort 
owner.”  However, he also purchased the right to sell the 1,000 virtual 
apartment deeds and the 100 virtual store deeds for in-game currency.  
Considering that in-game currency can be withdrawn from Project 
Entropia from any real-world ATM machine in the form of real-world 
currency, Mr. Jacobs can sell the deeds and convert the in-game proceeds 
into real-world money—all within the limits of the EULA.52  If he can sell 
the property, effectively for real-world money, then does he own 
something more than the right to play space station owner?  Did Mr. 
Jacobs gain an ownership interest, at least in the alienable deeds, that is 
arguably contrary to the EULA? 
 
[15] Perhaps, notwithstanding the language of the EULA, MindArk is 
selling some right in the virtual real estate to Mr. Jacobs.  The website on 
which the auction was hosted clearly states that the “ownership interest” in 
that virtual space station includes 1,000 apartment deeds, 100 shop deeds, 
and other virtual property.53  If the assignment of all virtual property rights 
to MindArk in the EULA controls the interpretation of any “ownership 
interest” listed in the offer, or if the represented “ownership interests” 
were merely rights to play certain aspects of the game in the first instance, 
then the question remains: what did Mr. Jacobs buy?  Consider also that 
the EULA states that MindArk can terminate Mr. Jacobs’ account at any 
time for no reason.54  According to the EULA, he owns merely a right to 
play “space station owner” but little else, and even that right can be taken 
away without cause.  Can the rights transferred really be so ephemeral?   
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 See Seth Schiesel, An Online Game’s Economy Yields A.T.M. Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 2, 2006, at E1.  See also Entropia Universe: Withdrawals: Entropia Universe Cash 
Card, http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5676.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).   
53 See Duncan, supra note 47. 
54 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6 (“MindArk may terminate 
this Agreement upon notice to Participant.  Such termination may be made without 
reason . . . .”).   
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[16] Perhaps, since the EULA had already been signed at the time the 
offer was made, a court would interpret the offer (insomuch as its terms 
conflicted with the EULA) as superseding the terms of the EULA.55  If 
this were the case, then the ownership interest of Mr. Jacobs might be less 
ephemeral.  The offer for sale, under the heading of “ownership rights,” 
offered, among other things, 1,000 “Apartment Deeds” and a “[s]pawning 
point for newcomers to Project Entropia [, which] will enable the owner to 
market his Space station Resort outside Project Entropia so that the 
newcomers will arrive directly at the resort . . . .”56  These terms of this 
offer may be in conflict with the EULA.  It is possible to read the 
ownership interest in the 1,000 apartment deeds as implying a right to sell 
the deeds to other players.  The sale of the ownership interest in the deeds 
to Mr. Jacobs could indicate that he has the right to retain his account, or 
at least the ability to sell the deeds, thereby at least partially overriding the 
termination and ownership clauses of the EULA.   
 
[17] The “spawning point” term in the offer for sale may also, at least 
partially, override the clauses of the EULA.  The term implies that the 
owner should be able to market his space station to new players, which 
implies that he will have a continuing ownership right.  If he has a right to 
market the space station over time, then a court might find Mr. Jacobs has 
a right to continue playing the game, or otherwise maintain pecuniary 
control over the space station in opposition to the termination and 
ownership clauses.   
 
[18] Moreover, a court might find that the plain meaning of the terms of 
the offer overrides the EULA’s ownership clause.  The EULA states that 
the players of the game cannot “own” any virtual item;57 however, the 
offer clearly includes “ownership rights.”58  Mr. Jacobs may “own” the 
space station and the related virtual property contrary to the terms of the 
ownership clause.  The question remains, however, if Mr. Jacobs “owns” 
                                                          
55 See Howard University. v. Good Food Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 127, n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
56 Posting by Mike Sellers to Tetra Nova, 
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2005/10/the_winner_and_.html (last visited Dec. 
18, 2006).  Sellers quotes language from the original offer to sell.  
57 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7. 
58 Duncan, supra note 47. 
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something, then what exactly are his rights?  I address that question in the 
discussion of the conceptualization and protection of bits in context. 
 
B. ENFORCEABILITY OF END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
 
[19] Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter believe that more cases 
surrounding virtual property rights will go to court notwithstanding the 
restrictive EULAs.59  “Click-through” agreements, such as the EULAs in 
the case of online games, are generally enforceable.60  The agreements 
themselves, which are electronic for most online games, are considered 
“writings” and, therefore, are enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.61  If 
the terms are presented to the user and the user accepts the terms, perhaps 
by pressing a button reading “I agree,” then the contract will generally be 
held as enforceable.62  However, as noted in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
shrinkwrap and click-through licenses may be unenforceable if they are 
contrary to positive law or are unconscionable.63   
 
                                                          
59 Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual World, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
50-51 (2004).  At least one such case was filed in the United States.  “BlackSnow 
Interactive, which runs the CamelotExchange Website, filed the suit . . . in the U.S. Court 
for the Central District of California against Mythic Entertainment, developer of the 
game ‘Dark Age of Camelot . . . .’”  David Becker, Game Exchange Dispute Goes to 
Court, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 7, 2002, http://news.com.com/2102-1040_3-
832347.html?tag=st.util.print. The case was eventually dismissed before trial. See 
generally Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Novel Legal Issues in 
Virtual Property, 234 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2005). 
60 See Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding 
that a user clicking an “I agree” button at the end of the EULA indicates the user’s assent 
to the provider’s terms).   
61 See In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, 
Section I. at *3-4.  (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (applying Washington law) (Not Reported in 
F.Supp.2d).   
62 Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D, 741 N.Y.S.2d 587, 587 (2d Dep't 2002) (holding 
that a user clicking an “I agree” button at the end of an EULA indicates the user’s assent 
to the provider’s terms).  91. 
63 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).  See also ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 650 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (overturnedrev’d on other 
grounds by ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)) (holding that a 
shrinkwrap license takes the “place of any bargains or agreements between mass market 
software producers and users, because the typical software transaction does not involve 
bargained agreements concerning use limitations . . . .”). 
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[20] The EULAs for online games do not appear to be contrary to positive 
law.64  Whether the EULAs in online games, such as MindArk’s EULA 
for Project Entropia,65 are unconscionable is debatable.  Below is a 
discussion of whether the EULA itself is unconscionable, looking 
particularly at termination66 and ownership clauses.67  There is also 
discussion of whether a sale of virtual property incorporating terms of the 
EULA is unconscionable.  This is followed by discussion of whether the 
contracts (either the EULA itself or the sale of virtual property 
incorporating terms of the EULA) should be reformed based on the 
reasonable expectations of the game players, and whether there is an 
implied duty on the part of the game company that would contravene the 
termination and ownership clauses. 
 
1. UNCONSCIONABILITY OF THE END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENT 
 
[21] A finding of unconscionability can rest on procedural 
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, or both.68  Generally, 
when addressing procedural unconscionability, courts consider the 
likelihood that the adhering party has read and understood the terms,69 the 
relative number of similar transactions in which each party has engaged,70 
the relative bargaining power of the parties,71 and whether there was 
                                                          
64 This paper proposes default rules for game player rights with respect to virtual 
property.  One might propose legislation or the courts might adopt precedential positions 
with respect to virtual property.  Today, however, there does not appear to be any positive 
law concerning game player rights with respect to virtual property. 
65 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10. 
66 Id. at § 6. 
67 Id. at  §§ 7-8. 
68 Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534  N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (citations 
omitted); Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409-10 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980).  See also Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 
1995) (recognizing that either procedural or substantive unconscionability is sufficient); 
Lewis Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1152-
53 (1976) (stating that enforceability of a contract is determined by the process leading 
up to the agreement). 
69 See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) 
(citations omitted). 
70 See Featherstone v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
71 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
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meaningful choice.72  These factors arguably weigh in favor of finding 
procedural unconscionability for the EULAs.  Whereas it may be 
impossible to know if the game player read and understood all of the terms 
of the contract,73 it is clear that the number of EULAs engaged in by game 
players is smaller by an order of magnitude of 1,000 to 10,000 than the 
number engaged in by game companies.74  There is no evidence, however, 
and it is unlikely, that MindArk or any game companies have negotiated 
or would negotiate with game players before they sign EULAs.75  
Furthermore, whereas game players clearly have a choice among game 
companies, since the terms of each game company’s EULA are similar, 
that choice may be illusory.76  Additionally, although game players can 
                                                          
72 Courts have also held that procedural unconscionability may be “satisfied if the 
agreement constitutes a contract of adhesion.”  This results in a similar analysis. (Parilla 
v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981)). 
73 Furthermore, “the general proposition that a person who signs a contract is bound by 
all of its terms even though he signed it without reading it may not be given full sweep 
where the contract is one of adhesion.”  Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citations 
omitted).  A contract of adhesion is defined as a “standardized contract . . . offered to 
consumers of goods and services on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it basis without 
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain . . . .”  Id. at 783.  On the other 
hand, as noted by Leff, though the terms of a contract of adhesion may not have been 
negotiated, this does not necessarily indicate that the contract should not be enforced.  
Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144 (1970).  The EULA was 
arguably signed with no realistic opportunity to bargain, and, therefore, may be a contract 
of adhesion.  As such, game players who sign the EULA might not be bound by all of its 
terms.  See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citations omitted). 
74 Project Entropia, for example, has over 300,000 players and MindArk presumably 
entered into an EULA with each of those players.  Entropia Universe, supra note 3. See 
also Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10. World of Warcraft has over 5 
million users worldwide.  Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft 
Surpasses Five Million Customers Worldwide (Dec. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.blizzard.com/press/051219.shtml. 
75 As noted by Leff, the adhesion contract provides an opportunity for the consumer to 
“flip the switch”: either enter into the contract provided by the drafting party or opt out of 
the commercial transaction altogether. In such transactions very few of the individual 
terms of the contract are open to bargaining.  Leff, supra note 73, at 142-43.  
76 Having multiple sellers offering similar or identical terms is tantamount to having no 
meaningful choice. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in 
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 47 (1993).  
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simply avoid playing these games, the ability to forego entering into a 
contract does not necessarily overcome procedural unconscionability.77 
 
[22] As noted by Margaret Radin however, courts are unlikely to 
invalidate click-through contracts, such as the EULAs discussed herein, on 
purely procedural unconscionability grounds.78  Instead, courts look to the 
substance of the contract and invalidate only those whose terms are so 
“onerous . . . [that] they are [unlikely] to be the result of buyer choice.”79  
Finding such onerousness of contract terms is tantamount to finding 
substantive unconscionability.  As such, any finding of procedural 
unconscionability of the EULAs would likely be based on a finding of 
substantive unconscionability.  Therefore, the discussion herein will focus 
on an analysis of the substantive unconscionability of the EULAs.  
 
[23] A court can find that a contract is substantively unconscionable when 
the terms unduly favor one party80 or when the “disputed provision of the 
contract falls outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the nondrafting 
party . . . .”81  It is arguably the case for Project Entropia that the EULA 
unduly favors MindArk.  MindArk, if it so chooses, can arbitrarily 
                                                          
77 See generally Williams, 350 F.2d 445 (holding a contract for furniture purchase 
unconscionable based in part on lack of meaningful choice where purchaser could have 
opted not to purchase at all); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding a contract for home purchase unconscionable based in part on 
lack of meaningful choice where buyers could have opted not to purchase at all).  
Although purchasing a home or furniture may be more essential—or at least more 
mainstream—than playing a game, courts should arguably not be biased against 
contractees’ rights with respect to games as compared to contractees’ rights with respect 
to more traditional agreements. 
78 Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1156 (2000).  
79 Id. at 1149.  Similarly, Craswell notes that onerous terms may indicate a lack of 
consent.  Craswell, supra note 76, at 41-42. 
80 See John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F.Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986).  See 
also Sprague v. Household Int'l, No. 04-0106-CV-W-NKL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11694, at *20 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2005). 
81 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  See also C 
& J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975); Craswell, 
supra note 76, at 27 (noting that whereas the reasonable expectations doctrine was 
originally applied to insurance contracts, it is increasingly being applied “to other 
standard form contracts as well.”). 
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undermine virtual property rights or terminate game players’ accounts, all 
within the terms of the EULA.82  A court might find such facially one-
sided terms unduly favorable to MindArk.  
 
[24] Additionally, as to the one-sided nature of a EULA, a court can also 
consider whether there is a lack of business necessity for harsh terms in 
the EULA,83 and the importance of the rights the drafter retains by 
incorporating particular terms.84  MindArk might argue that it has a 
business necessity to retain the right to terminate players or destroy virtual 
property at will in order to maintain control of or otherwise sustain Project 
Entropia.  MindArk might also argue that it would not terminate player 
accounts or destroy virtual property arbitrarily given counterincentives, 
such as maintaining a good reputation among game players.  Those 
concerns about reputation, however, are not part of the contract and do not 
negate the unduly one-sided nature of the contract or the lack of business 
necessity for the terms.  If MindArk does not need arbitrary termination 
and ownership clauses, then a court might be left to ask: why include such 
harsh clauses?  A finding that there is no reason for the arbitrariness of the 
clauses weighs in favor of finding the EULA, or at least the harsh clauses, 
substantively unconscionable. 
 
[25] Furthermore, the virtual property theory of bits in context described 
below may provide a more reasonable distribution of the rights between 
Mr. Jacobs and MindArk than the EULA for Project Entropia.  That the 
EULA is unnecessarily harsh or oppressive, and that there exist more 
balanced theories or proposals for virtual property rights, supports a 
finding that the restrictive terms of the EULA may be unenforceable as 
unconscionable “in the light of the general commercial background and 
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case.”85 
 
[26] The terms of the EULA also arguably fall outside of the reasonable 
expectations of game players and; therefore, favor a finding of substantive 
                                                          
82 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at §§ 6-8. 
83 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citations omitted). 
84 See Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass. 1992) (citing A. Corbin, Contracts 
§ 128, at 551 (1963 & Supp. 1991)).  
85 Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citations omitted). 
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unconscionability.  Whereas it might be difficult or impossible to fully 
determine what would constitute reasonable expectations of game players, 
a game player will reasonably expect that she will not be terminated 
arbitrarily from a game and that her virtual property will not be arbitrarily 
destroyed.  For example, consider a game player who is part of Project 
Entropia’s population of over 300,000 players.  It is reasonable for her to 
expect that she will not be terminated from the game arbitrarily and for no 
cause while the other 300,000 players continue to play the game.  Such an 
arbitrary termination would be permissible under the current termination 
clause.86  Similarly, a game player who owns a virtual sword of a 
particular type will reasonably expect that, if other players who own the 
same type of sword retain their virtual swords from one day to the next, 
that she will also.  Under the current terms of the EULA, however, 
arbitrary and individual destruction of virtual property by MindArk would 
be permissible.87  That the EULA would allow MindArk to take actions 
that are arguably outside of the reasonable expectations of the game 
players, both with respect to termination of players’ accounts and with 
respect to virtual property, favors a finding that the terms are substantively 
unconscionable.  Based on the arguments above, a court could find that at 
least these termination and ownership clauses are substantively 
unconscionable and, therefore, that at least these terms of the EULA are 
unenforceable.88 
 
2. UNCONSCIONABILITY OF THE SALE 
 
[27] There are colorable arguments for the unconscionability of EULAs 
that allow for arbitrary game-player account termination and require game 
players to surrender all rights to virtual property.  A contract for the sale of 
virtual property by a game company, such as MindArk’s sale of the space 
station to Mr. Jacobs, might also be unconscionable.  If the sale of virtual 
property grants rights to the virtual property in a manner that overrides the 
terms of the EULA, then the arguments made above for the 
unconscionability of the EULA would not apply.  There would still be, 
however, a question as to what rights the player has gained with respect to 
                                                          
86 Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6. 
87 Id. at §§ 7-8. 
88 See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449.   
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the purchased virtual property.  This is discussed below with respect to the 
proposed default right to bits in context.  
 
[28] If, on the other hand, the sale of virtual property were interpreted to 
incorporate the ownership and termination clauses of the EULA, then the 
case for finding unconscionability would be stronger than for the EULA 
alone.89  A sale incorporating the termination and ownership clauses 
would be even more favorable to MindArk than the EULA itself.  For 
example, MindArk would be able to sell the space station to Mr. Jacobs, 
terminate his account the next day for any reason, and resell the space 
station to another user.  Furthermore, MindArk’s ability to sell virtual 
property, combined with the ability to terminate accounts at will, might 
result in undesirable, but rational, behavior.  If MindArk felt that it would 
receive a net benefit by terminating Mr. Jacobs’ account and reselling the 
space station (for example, if Mr. Jacobs or his character were particularly 
disliked in the Project Entropia community), notwithstanding concerns 
about reputation, then it might rationally do so after the sale—all within 
the terms of the EULA.90  Clearly, given the preposterous liberty such a 
one-sided sale would provide MindArk, the terms of the sale incorporating 
the terms of the EULA are unduly favorable to MindArk, and thus 
arguably unconscionable. 
 
                                                          
89 If, in a particular instance or litigated case, a sale of virtual property were found to 
incorporate the termination and ownership clauses of the EULA and, therefore, to be 
unconscionable and unenforceable as discussed below, then in future sales a game 
company would likely incorporate wording that would clarify that the contract for sale of 
virtual property did not incorporate the harsh terms of the EULA.  In the future sales, 
which would arguably grant virtual property rights, there would remain a question as to 
what rights were granted. 
90 Getting rid of an unpopular character may be seen in the virtual society of Project 
Entropia as a net positive action, notwithstanding the unpopular player’s loss of virtual 
property.  That is, the damage done to MindArk’s reputation by destroying virtual 
property might be outweighed by the benefit afforded to its reputation by 
excommunicating the unpopular player.  The destruction of virtual property in that case 
might have no negative real-world economic repercussions for MindArk.  If this were the 
case, MindArk would have incentive to terminate Mr. Jacobs’ account: it would get rid of 
an unpopular character, NeverDie, and it would allow them to resell the virtual space 
station, presumably for another $100,000.   
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
20 
[29] If a court did find the EULA itself, or the offer for sale interpreted as 
incorporating the harsh terms of the EULA, to be unconscionable, and Mr. 
Jacobs was bestowed some right with respect to the virtual property, then 
the question would remain: What are his rights?  I attempt to address this 
below with the proposed default right to bits in context.   
 
3. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
 
[30] Perhaps analyzing the conscionability of the EULA and the sale of 
virtual property incorporating the terms of the EULA goes beyond what is 
needed.  As has been seen primarily in the insurance context, courts can 
look to the “reasonable expectations” of contractees to decide whether 
particular provisions of a contract should be enforced.91  When a game 
company sells a virtual item to a game player, as when Mr. Jacobs 
purchased the $100,000 virtual space station from MindArk, reasonable 
parties would expect that the terms in the offer for sale that apparently 
grant rights to virtual property would override the harsh terms of the 
EULA.92   
 
[31] Even if a court found that the sale incorporated the terms of the 
EULA, however, a court might still find that the incorporated terms of the 
EULA do not meet the reasonable expectations of the game player.  To 
assess reasonable expectations, the court determines whether the game 
player was specially informed of “important, but obscure,” terms, whether 
the terms were generally known by game players, and whether the contract 
was ambiguous.93  If the terms do not meet reasonable expectations of 
game players, then the court can replace the harsh terms with what it 
believes is “objectively reasonable.”94  In Mr. Jacobs’ case, he was not 
given notice of the harsh terms, given that the wording of the offer for sale 
of the space station apparently overrode the harsh terms; there was 
                                                          
91 Craswell, supra note 76, at 27-29 (citations omitted).  See generally Robert E. Keeton, 
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970). 
92 See supra notes 55 to 56 and accompanying text. 
93 Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 
1985). 
94 Keeton, supra note 91, at 967, 974.  Accord Perrine v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 
56 N.J. 120, 127 (N.J. 1970). See also Craswell, supra note 76, at 14.  See also Radin, 
supra note 78, at 1156. 
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ambiguity in the sale, given the apparent contradiction between the 
wording of the offer and the terms of the EULA; and a reasonable player 
would not assume that such harsh terms were in the contract.  If the harsh 
terms incorporated into the sale were replaced with terms that were 
objectively reasonable, however, there would still be a question as to what 
rights game players would be afforded.   
 
[32] When considering the EULA itself, and not a sale incorporating the 
terms of the EULA, a court might find that the EULA’s termination and 
ownership clauses fall outside the reasonable expectations of game players 
and therefore should be replaced with clauses that are objectively 
reasonable – although the case may not be as strong as for the sale 
incorporating the harsh terms.  A game player, when signing up for a 
game, might expect that her account would only be terminated for good 
cause and that her virtual property would not arbitrarily disappear, 
notwithstanding that the EULA indicates otherwise.  Although the 
language of the termination and ownership clauses of the EULA are 
clear,95 the terms are arguably outside the general knowledge or 
expectations of the game players96 and have not been specifically pointed 
out to game players. 97  Therefore, a court could find the terms to be 
outside the reasonable expectations of game players and replace the 
offending terms with objectively reasonable terms.98  The question 
remains, however, what terms would be objectively reasonable?  A 
proposal for such rights is presented in the discussion of bits in context.   
 
 
 
                                                          
95 Project Entropia’s EULA appears on the first page a player accesses when applying for 
an account. See Project Entropia, Apply for an Account, supra note 10. 
96 See supra notes 86-88. 
97 The terms are included in the EULA, but the mere inclusion of terms in a contract is 
not always sufficient to overcome the reasonable expectations of contractees.  Atwater 
Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 278-79 (holding that a non-standard, non-ambiguous 
burglary definition in an insurance contract did not meet the reasonable expectations of 
the insured in part because the definition was not separately discussed or pointed out to 
the insured). 
98 See supra note 94. 
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4. IS THERE AN IMPLIED DUTY? 
 
[33] One might be tempted to bind a game player to the terms of the 
EULA since she had an opportunity to view the harsh terms.  As has been 
seen in other commercial transactions, however, purchasers do not always 
bear all the risk in transactions, even in contravention of terms set forth by 
the seller.  The warranty of merchantability, for example, was developed 
to place some burden for the quality of goods on sellers, 99 regardless of 
whether there was an absence of related terms in the contract or in 
contravention of the terms of the contract.100 
 
[34] The warranty of merchantability, which deals with the quality of 
goods, might not apply directly in the case of the rights of game players to 
virtual property, since the duties in question arguably relate to services and 
not products.  There are parallels, however.  The implied warranty of 
merchantability provides reasonable rights for purchasers.  If one adopts 
the objectively reasonable expectations of a game player (e.g., that a game 
player is purchasing a contractual right to continue playing a game, unless 
there is a good cause for termination, and to continue having reasonable 
continuity of access to virtual property within the game) as the standard to 
which the game companies should be held, then a game company would 
breach the implied duty by arbitrarily terminating the account or 
destroying virtual property, which would be permitted under the EULA.  
A parallel to the implied warranty of merchantability would provide game 
players with some implied rights with respect to termination and virtual 
property that contravene the harsh terms of the EULA.  The rights that 
might be implied are addressed below with respect to bits in context. 
 
 
 
                                                          
99 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 630 (Wash. 1913) (holding that a 
manufacturer of food products has an implied warranty of merchantability where no 
express warranty was given).  See also U.C.C. § 2-314 (stating that merchants are 
generally held to implied warranty as to the fitness and quality of merchandise sold). 
100 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (stating that a warranty of merchantability is implied, regardless of 
the terms of the contract, unless there is “conspicuous” wording to the contrary). 
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C. COPYRIGHT 
 
[35] Mia Garlick and Molly Stephens have discussed the issue of virtual 
property rights in the context of game companies attempting to preclude 
sales of virtual property.  Both have concluded that copyright law cannot 
be used by game companies to stop users from selling virtual property.  
Garlick argues that neither the copyright doctrine of “substantial 
similarity” nor the copyright doctrine of “infringement of derivative 
works” should enable game companies to exclude game players from 
selling in-game items101 and that courts should consider with more weight 
the creative contribution of the gamers.102 
 
[36] Stephens notes that none of the copyright doctrines of protection 
against making copies, making derivative works, selling copies, 
performing publicly, and displaying publicly should allow game 
companies to preclude users from selling in-game items.103  Stephens 
further argues that no part of intellectual property law, including 
copyright, is likely to afford protection to game players for their in-game 
assets.104 
 
[37] The analysis of Garlick and Stephens may indicate that copyright law 
is unable to preclude game players from obtaining some rights to virtual 
property.  That is, based on the analysis of Garlick and Stephens, MindArk 
cannot rely on copyright law to deny Mr. Jacobs all rights with respect to 
virtual property. 
 
 
                                                          
101 Mia Garlick, Player, Pirate or Conducer? A Consideration of the Rights of Online 
Gamers, 7 YALE J. OF L. & TECH. 1, 28-29 (Spring 2004-2005). 
102 Id. at 41. 
103 See generally, Molly Stephens, Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the 
Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 1513 (2002). 
104 Id. at 1530-1531, 1532 (arguing, however, that a game player may have a right to her 
character, but not to the assets it carries.  She argues that game players may be able to 
rely on unfair competition doctrine to protect some aspects of their in-game characters). 
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IV. CONCEPTUALIZING VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
 
[38] Assuming that the threshold issue of whether game players have 
rights with respect to virtual property is resolved affirmatively, the 
question remains: what should be protected?  That is, presuming that the 
EULAs (or copyright, etc.) do not preclude rights to virtual property, there 
is still a question as to how rights should be apportioned between game 
players and game companies.  In order to address this issue, it is important 
to properly conceptualize the rights bestowed upon game players with 
respect to the virtual property that they own in games.  Improper 
conceptualization of the default rights of game players could cause 
improper rulings or faulty or unduly complicated protection of players’ 
rights.  Below, I reject a few conceptualizations of the rights to virtual 
property: Epstein’s cybertrespass theory, protection of the integer as a 
numeric concept, and protection of the database on which the bits 
representing the virtual property reside.  The rejections of these ideas are 
followed by a discussion of conceptualizing rights to virtual property as 
bits in context.   
 
[39] Online games are typically built using client programs (clients) and 
server programs (servers).  The clients reside and run on the game players’ 
computers.  The servers run on the game provider’s server.  Each client 
communicates electronically with a single server or with multiple servers 
acting as a single server.105  The functionality of a client typically includes 
rendering the graphics for the game player’s view.  The server typically 
stores information about the shared aspects of the virtual world in which 
the game players’ characters reside.  Other information related to 
particular user accounts might be stored on the server or the client.  
Decisions as to where to store particular information or data related to 
characters and game play is usually based on server and client computing 
                                                          
105 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Client/Server Software 
Architectures--An Overview, 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/clientserver_body.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
20006).  See also Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Three Tier 
Architecture, http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/threetier.html#34492  and 
Transaction Processing Monitor Technology, 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/tpmt.html.  
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resource availability and on reducing the bandwidth needed to transfer 
information between the client and server.106   
 
A. EPSTEIN’S CYBERTRESPASS THEORY 
 
[40] Richard Epstein, in his cybertrespass theory, proffers that the law 
should protect real-world chattels (computers) on which the in-game 
elements reside.107  In a strict construction, this would tie rights in virtual 
property to the physical computer or server on which the electronic 
representation of the virtual property resides.  For example, in a case 
where a game player’s in-game inventory includes a virtual sword, 
represented by an integer on the game company’s server,108 the strict 
construction of the cybertrespass theory would provide the game company 
protection for the computer server on which the integer representing the 
virtual sword resides.  No protection would be afforded to the game user.  
If, on the other hand, information about the virtual sword was held within 
a client program residing on the game player’s computer,109 then the game 
player would have protection for the virtual property and the game 
company would not have protection.  This strict construction would hinge 
rights to virtual property on the game company’s decision of where to 
store data related to the virtual property. 
 
                                                          
106 Id. 
107 See generally Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (Winter 2003). 
108 For simplicity we are assuming that these virtual items are represented as integers and 
are stored in databases.  In general, they may be represented as floating point numbers, 
complex data structures, raw bits, or any other electronic representation.  Furthermore, 
whereas it is likely that most game companies use databases to store the integer or other 
electronic representation of the virtual property, the bits-in-context theory is not limited 
to database representations.  This theory applies equally to other storage mechanisms, 
such as flat file or file/folder hierarchies.  It is also herein presented that the bits will 
reside on the game provider’s computer server.  The theory, however, applies equally 
regardless of where the bits are stored.  The bits may be stored on the game player’s 
computer or may be distributed between the client and server.  See infra notes 111 to 114. 
The program running the game on the server will interpret the integer as representing the 
virtual property of a particular user.  That is, the program creates the context in which the 
server can interpret the integer to be the user’s virtual property. 
109 Client/Server Software Architectures, supra note 105. 
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[41] In some systems of clients and servers, information is replicated 
between the client and server.110  In such cases, more complex algorithms 
are needed to ensure that the data between the two remains synchronized.  
For example, one of the two data sources would be considered dominant 
and editable, and the other source considered a local cache or copy of the 
data, which cannot be edited.111  The cybertrespass theory might accord 
rights to one or both copies of the data.  If the rights are split then, as 
described below, it is not clear how the two sets of rights would be 
apportioned.  On the other hand, if the rights are not split, but instead are 
given to the owner of the chattel on which the dominant and editable copy 
of the data resides, then other problems may arise.  In some systems, the 
designation of which copy of the data is dominant and editable shifts over 
time.112  That is, the dominant, editable copy of the data could be on either 
the server computer or the client computer at any given moment.  To 
further complicate the matter, with more complex data, the first portion of 
the data could be editable on the server computer and a second portion 
could be editable on the client computer.113  It would be unclear who had 
virtual property protection under the cybertrespass theory, given the 
division of control.114  As this abbreviated discussion of distributed system 
theory illustrates, depending on how a game is designed and where data 
related to characters is stored, drastically different legal rights could 
emerge under the cybertrespass theory.  Given that the game player should 
receive the same rights regardless of where the data resides, the strict 
                                                          
110 Microsoft Development Network, Replicating Data Between a Server and Clients, 
http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms151787.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). 
111 See, e.g., Alan Fekete et al., Eventually Serializable Data Services, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING 
300 (ACM Press 1996), available at 
http://citeseer.csail.mit.edu/fekete96eventuallyserializable.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
112 See, e.g., Kai Shen et al., Neptune: Scalable Replication Management and 
Programming Support for Cluster-Based Network Services, PROCEEDINGS OF 3RD 
USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS 197 (2001), available 
at http://www.usenix.org/events/usits01/full_papers/shen/shen_html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006). 
113 Stijn Dekeyser, Towards a New Approach to Tightly Coupled Document 
Collaboration,  PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH AUSTRALASIAN DOCUMENT COMPUTING 
SYMPOSIUM (2004), available at http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~alistair/adcs2004/ 
papers/paper10.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
114 Client/Server Software Architectures, supra note 105. 
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construction of the cybertrespass theory is clearly not the desired 
conceptualization for virtual property rights. 
 
[42] Perhaps, however, the cybertrespass theorist would argue for a 
broader construction: providing shared rights in the part of the computer 
disk on which the important bits reside between the owner of the server 
(the game company) and the game player.  This would circumvent some 
of the overly complex rights-determination circumstances arising from the 
distributed nature of the online games and would allow apportioning of the 
rights to virtual property between the game provider and the game player.  
It is not for the portion of the computer disk, however, that the game 
player wants protection.  Under this broad construction of the 
cybertrespass theory, absurd circumstances could arise.  A game provider 
could leave intact a file server to which a user’s rights are attached and use 
a different file server for the game, thereby effectively disregarding any 
useful virtual property rights; or a game provider could change the game 
so that the bits on the protected portion of the server are useless or unused 
– again disregarding any useful virtual property rights.   
 
[43] Consider an example where a game player’s character “owns” one 
million in game currency (GC).  The one million GC are represented as an 
integer on one of the game provider’s disk drives.  Under the broad 
reading of the cybertrespass theory, the game player would have some 
right to the portion of the file server on which the integer representing the 
one million GC is stored.  The game company could not legally delete the 
integer but could alter or destroy the usefulness of the integer by changing 
the way in which currency is handled in the game and ignoring the integer.  
This would effectively destroy any rights the game player would want 
protected.  The game player wants rights to the functionality associated 
with the one million GC, not the portion of the disk on which the one 
million GC are represented.   
 
B. THERE SHOULD BE NO PROTECTION FOR THE INTEGER AS A NUMERIC 
CONCEPT 
 
[44] Courts should not base protection of virtual property on the integer 
representing the virtual property that resides in the game company’s 
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database.  The user does not have a right to that integer outside of the 
context of the game or outside of the context of the user’s account for that 
game.115  Furthermore, even within the context of the game, another user 
may have the same virtual sword and therefore have protection for an 
equal integer stored elsewhere in the game’s database.  The user should be 
afforded no protection for that number outside the context of the user’s 
account within the game.   
 
[45] If the game company changed or upgraded the game, then it might 
alter the underlying representation of the virtual property. 116  Clearly, a 
right to virtual property should not follow the old representation – the old 
integer.  If it did, then neither the interests of the game player nor the 
interests of the game provider would be met.  A “loss of virtual property” 
would be caused by changing the underlying representation, even if the 
game player retained all of her rights to use her virtual property within the 
context of the game.  A right that follows the new, changed representation 
is appropriate.  If the default right follows the new representation, then we 
are closer to a conception of what is valuable to the game player – closer 
to a conception of virtual property as bits in context. 
 
C. PROTECTION SHOULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO THE DATABASE 
CONTAINING THE INTEGER 
 
[46] Virtual property protection should not be afforded to the portion of 
the database in which the virtual property resides.  A database is structured 
data stored on a hard disk.117  It is conceivable to assign protection of 
virtual property to the portion of the database storing the integer 
                                                          
115 If a virtual sword were represented by the integer forty-two, then the user would have 
no right to the number forty-two outside of the context of the game.  The user should 
have no protection for the number forty-two as used in a business application, in another 
game, or in any other context. 
116 Underlying representations of virtual property might be changed in order to keep 
virtual property consistent in the face of changing game code. 
117 See Paragon Corporation, Databases: Past, Present, and Future, June 13, 2003,  
http://www.paragoncorporation.com/ArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=20 (last visited Dec. 
18, 2006) (explaining that “database” typically refers to the electronic representation of 
data on a hard disk.  A database server is the computer that controls access to the data in 
the database).   
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representing the virtual property.118  This would overcome some of the 
problems associated with the cybertrespass theory insomuch as migration 
of the database from one physical computer hard disk to another would not 
cause a fragmenting or failure of the rights, because the database, as a unit, 
would still exist on the server to which the database is migrated.  
However, paralleling a problem with the cybertrespass theory, the 
database could be maintained even if the game no longer used the 
database.  Such a circumstance would destroy the usefulness of the game 
player’s virtual property while maintaining the database containing the 
virtual property.   
 
[47] Furthermore, in such a legal regime, a user’s enjoyment of virtual 
property could continue even if the portion of the database in which the 
integer representing the virtual property originally or previously resided 
were destroyed.  For example, if a game provider upgraded a game, 
created a new database that included a representation for the virtual 
property, and destroyed the old database that included the original 
representation of the virtual property, then the game player would 
continue to enjoy the virtual property notwithstanding the destruction of 
the virtual property’s original representation within the original database.  
Attaching rights associated with virtual property to the destroyed database 
representation would create liability where there was no harm.  Instead, it 
would be more coherent to have the rights to virtual property attach first to 
the original representation in the original database and later to the 
subsequent representation in the upgraded database.  This approaches the 
suggested protection of bits within their context, as discussed next. 
 
D. PROTECTION SHOULD BE FOR THE PARTICULAR INTEGER (BITS) AS USED 
IN THE GAME (CONTEXT) 
 
[48] In order to best protect the rights of game players with respect to 
functionality of virtual property in the context of computer games, a 
conceptualization of the rights of game players should be based on bits 
                                                          
118 The same argument applies to all electronic data sets.  For example, in a flat file-based 
system, protection should not be afforded to the part of the file that holds the integer 
representing the virtual property.  For a folder/file hierarchy, protection should not be 
afforded to the file or part of a file within the hierarchy that stores the integer. 
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(the integer represented electronically) in context (as used in the game).  It 
is within the context of a game that the bits have value, either objective or 
subjective, and it is over bits representing virtual property as used in the 
context of a game that issues of legal rights arise.   
 
[49] One court case has already followed this construction.  In China, a 
user’s virtual property (the bits) in an online game (the context) was lost – 
allegedly due to a hacker.  Li Hongchen had spent years, and over one 
thousand dollars, building up a virtual arsenal in Red Moon, a persistent, 
online, multiuser game provided by Arctic Ice.  One day he found that his 
virtual arsenal was missing.  Thus, the bits representing his virtual arsenal 
were no longer accessible in the context of the game Red Moon.  In the 
court case that ensued, Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology 
Development Co. in the Chaoyang District People's Court in Beijing, the 
court found that the game provider, Arctic Ice, was negligent in allowing a 
hacker to access and alter Li Hongchen’s account and alter the bits 
representing the arsenal.  The court ordered Arctic Ice to replace the 
virtual property – to replace the bits so that they could be used in the 
context of the game.119 
 
[50] It does not matter that Arctic Ice, in replacing the virtual property, 
might use different bits120 or that the replaced bits might be on a different 
physical hard disk or in a different electronic database.121  The bits 
representing the virtual property, as used in the context of the game, are 
what held value for Li Hongchen.  The bits in context provided him 
functionality, and it was for those bits that he sought protection.  A 
construction of a default right to virtual property associated with the 
numeric representation, the electronic database, or the physical server 
                                                          
119 David Canton, Theft Case Raises Questions, LONDON FREE PRESS (Can.), March 20, 
2004, at C5. 
120 If Arctic Ice had upgraded Red Moon, changing the underlying representation of 
virtual property within the context of the game, then the bits used to replace the virtual 
arsenal might have been different than those that were used before the hacker’s attack. 
121 If Arctic Ice, from the time of the initial destruction of the virtual arsenal to the time 
the bits were restored, had moved the game to a different physical server, then the case 
would not be resolved by focusing on the portion of the old server on which the bits 
resided.   
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would at best provide an obscuring method of understanding the rights of 
and the remedy for Li Hongchen. 
 
[51] Conceptualizing the default right as bits in context should help courts 
handle the subtle intricacies of individual cases coherently.  Of course, the 
default right of protecting bits in context cannot be absolute.  The 
following section discusses how the bits-in-context conceptualization of 
rights to virtual property can provide a guideline for future cases, and how 
existing doctrines can inform the protection of bits in context. 
 
V. DEFAULT RIGHTS TO BITS IN CONTEXT 
 
A. PROTECTION FROM DESTRUCTION AND DEVALUATION 
 
[52] The default right for virtual property should protect bits in context 
from destruction or theft – in certain circumstances.  That is, virtual 
property as represented by bits in the context of an online game should 
generally be protected from actions which destroy the bits themselves 
while the context, the game, continues.  The case of Li Hongchen v. 
Beijing Arctic Ice is an example of such protection.  Li Hongchen’s virtual 
property was protected from destruction caused by Arctic Ice’s 
negligence.122  On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which 
virtual property should not be protected from loss or theft.  Consider, for 
example, if a game company lost virtual property due to a natural disaster.  
If a hurricane hit its computer center and caused the details of particular 
virtual property to be unrecoverable, but did not cause so much damage 
that the game was discontinued, then the game company arguably should 
not be responsible for the lost virtual property.  This begs the question: 
when should virtual property be protected from loss or theft?   
 
[53] Virtual property should also be protected from devaluation – in 
certain circumstances.  Suppose, for example, that a game company 
introduces a set of virtual armor.  A player determines a way to use the 
armor to make her in-game character effectively invincible, thereby 
making the armor very valuable.  The invincibility is a problem for the 
                                                          
122 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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game company, which strives to keep a game “balanced.”123  The game 
company arguably should be allowed to modify the game (the context of 
the bits) to change the unbalanced aspects of the armor.  Thus, the game 
company should be able to change the virtual armor’s characteristics 
within the game.  Since balancing will typically weaken the armor, the 
change is likely to devalue the armor.  How much devaluation is too 
much?  When is devaluation justified? 
 
[54] To address the scenarios of permissible and prohibited devaluation 
and destruction (which is arguably a special case of devaluation) of virtual 
property, I consider issues of grouping virtual property, permissible and 
impermissible devaluation, and partial and total devaluation. 
 
1. WHAT PRECISELY IS BEING DEVALUED? 
 
[55] Before addressing prohibited destruction and devaluation, courts must 
address whether or how virtual items should be grouped for consideration.  
If the game player has a set of virtual armor comprising chest, arm, and 
leg plates, then should the set of armor be considered together for 
purposes of determining devaluation, or should each piece of armor be 
considered separately?  Should all of a player’s virtual property within a 
game be grouped together when considering devaluation?  If the game 
player has a set of virtual armor worth $100 and a virtual sword worth 
$200, then should one consider the devaluation of the $300 inventory or 
the devaluation of the armor and sword separately?   
 
[56] Grouping all virtual property together would create an undue bias 
against those game players who own more virtual property.  If a player 
held only one piece of virtual property, then it would be protected from 
destruction or total devaluation since that piece of virtual property would 
be the inventory.  However, if a devalued piece of virtual property were 
part of a large, valuable inventory, then it might not be protected.  
Completely devaluing the piece of virtual property would devalue the 
inventory only slightly.  Perhaps, instead, a decision of what to group for 
                                                          
123 “Balancing” a game refers to ensuring that no particular type of virtual property is 
significantly more powerful than other alternatives and ensuring that no particular virtual 
property provides one character or one type of character undue power.   
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devaluation purposes could be based on whether the items could be found 
or purchased separately or whether the items are generally purchased or 
used together.  Regardless of how virtual property is grouped, however, 
one must consider when devaluation should be permitted. 
 
2. PROHIBITING UNJUST DESTRUCTION AND DEVALUATION: LOOKING TO 
THE DUTIES OF BAILEES AND THE “GOOD CAUSE” AND “GOOD FAITH” 
DOCTRINES 
 
[57] An approach that courts might adopt to determine whether a 
particular devaluation or destruction of virtual property was permissible 
would be to borrow from the contract law doctrine of “good cause.”  In 
some jurisdictions, for example, an employer has a recognized interest in 
running the business profitably.124  Furthermore, the employer’s interest in 
profitability outweighs the employee’s interest in continued 
employment.125  The employer does not, however, have unlimited 
discretion in firing employees.  The employer may fire employees for 
legitimate business reasons but not for all reasons,126 and in particular not 
for reasons that would contravene public policy.127  Although devaluation 
in the context of virtual property is arguably not balanced against the dire 
public policy concerns that infect employment termination cases, some of 
the analysis used in the employment context could provide useful insight 
for courts when considering devaluation.   
 
                                                          
124 See, e.g., Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 776 P.2d 768, 777 (Idaho 1988) (Huntley, J., 
dissenting). 
125 See, e.g., McCone v. New Eng. Tel. and Tel. Co., 471 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 1984) 
(holding that employee’s interest, based on past performance, in potential future 
promotions or salary increases does not require employer to continue employment if that 
employee was fired for an otherwise legitimate reason). 
126 See Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 797 P.2d 232, 234-35 (Mont. 1990) (citations 
omitted).  See also Askin v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 85-5120, 1986 WL 16324, 
at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1986) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
254-55 (1981)).   
127 Employers may not fire employees in retaliation for refusing to perform actions that 
would be illegal.  See e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 
(Ariz. 1985) (holding that it was not legitimate to fire an employee who refused to engage 
in illegal activity, activity that would be indecent exposure), superseded by statute 
Arizona Employment Protection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (LexisNexis 2005).  
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[58] One approach to finding a reasonable balance between the rights of 
the game players to virtual property and the financial rights of game 
companies would be to allow game companies to devalue virtual property 
for legitimate business reasons.  Consider Mr. Jacobs’ purchase of the 
$100,000 space station.128  If MindArk later determined that there was 
“overpopulation” in the game129 and that new land areas were needed to 
reduce the overpopulation problem, then MindArk might add a new 
“moon” to Project Entropia.  The addition of the moon is likely to reduce 
the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station by decreasing the scarcity of land 
and thereby decreasing the value of the alienable residences on the space 
station.130  In such a scenario, courts might find that MindArk acted for a 
legitimate business reason and that the devaluation of the space station 
would therefore not be compensable.  
 
[59] Drawing a parallel to good cause may not, however, bring 
satisfactory results in every case.  Game companies may have legitimate 
business reasons for particular actions that would be contrary to what is 
just and equitable.  Consider again Mr. Jacobs’ purchase of the space 
station.  Some may consider it legitimate from a business perspective, for 
MindArk to give space stations to every player in Project Entropia the 
very next day.  Such action could make Project Entropia more popular, 
allowing MindArk to make more money.  It might also allow MindArk to 
sell larger quantities of other virtual items – perhaps items that are needed 
for a functioning space station.  Whereas this appears to be based on a 
legitimate business decision, it does not strike one as a fair balance of the 
rights of Mr. Jacobs and MindArk.  Perhaps the scenario represents, 
                                                          
128 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.   
129 “Overpopulation” in a game may cause, among other things, difficulties in 
synchronization and rendering when large numbers of players are all within view of each 
other.  If players are dispersed, then fewer game players will interact with one another 
and, therefore, the synchronizing and rendering problems will be ameliorated. 
130 Duncan, supra note 47 (noting that the space station included 1,000 apartment deeds 
and 100 store deeds which Mr. Jacobs could sell to other players).  On the other hand, if 
there really were overpopulation in the game, then the scarcity of land may have 
increased and there might be a net increase in the value of the salable portions of Mr. 
Jacobs’ space station.  For argument’s sake, however, it is assumed that there is a net 
decrease in the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station upon introduction of the new moon. 
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instead, a situation in which the game company should compensate the 
virtual property owner.131 
 
[60] Courts might also consider whether the action on the part of the game 
company is a breach of “good faith and fair dealing” in the contract drawn 
between the game company and the game player.132  The “doctrine duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract . . . [and t]he 
boundaries set by the duty of good faith are generally defined by the 
parties' intent and reasonable expectations in entering the contract.”133  In 
the example above, one might argue that Mr. Jacobs purchased only the 
functionality associated with the space station, that the good faith duty of 
MindArk extends only to providing those functions, and that the value of 
the space station is irrelevant.  That is, even if MindArk gave away space 
stations to every player in Project Entropia, Mr. Jacobs could continue to 
perform all of the functions related to space station ownership, but the 
potential economic value of those actions would be greatly diluted or 
eliminated completely.134  If these were the only duties of MindArk with 
respect to the space station, then the game company arguably would not 
have to compensate Mr. Jacobs for his loss.  Perhaps, however, merely 
providing functionality to Mr. Jacobs “evad[es] . . . the spirit of the 
bargain.”135  The duty of good faith could encompass both providing the 
functionality and not unduly diluting the value of the rights purchased.  If 
such were understood to be the implied duty on the part of MindArk, then 
flooding the space station market would breach its good faith duty with 
respect to the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station.   
 
                                                          
131 Even with compensation, this might be economically rational for MindArk if creating 
the multitude of space stations provided more value to MindArk than it took from Mr. 
Jacobs, so that MindArk would have the surplus to compensate Mr. Jacobs for his loss. 
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
133 Cross & Cross Props., Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(citing Contemp. Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 923 n.8 (2d Cir. 
1977) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)). 
134 Duncan, supra note 47. 
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205(d) (1981) (noting that a party does not 
engage in “good faith performance” of a bargain if they “evad[e] . . . the spirit of the 
bargain”). 
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[61] Protection of bits in context from unjust devaluation or destruction 
also parallels the duty of reasonable care owed by bailees in mutually 
beneficial bailments.  Traditionally, the duty owed by a bailee to a bailor 
was based on whether each party benefited from the bailment.  If the 
bailment primarily benefited the bailor (e.g., when a bailee finds a bailor’s 
lost property), then the bailee’s duty was based on gross negligence.  If the 
bailment primarily benefited the bailee (e.g., when a bailee borrows a car 
from the bailor), then the bailee had a duty to act with great care.  If the 
bailment benefited both parties (e.g., a hotel storing the valuables of its 
customers), then the bailee owed a duty of ordinary and reasonable care.136  
Some courts have rejected classifying the duties of bailees based on the 
balance of the benefits to the parties of the bailment and instead use a 
unified standard of reasonable care under the circumstances of the case.137   
 
[62] In order to see the parallels with bailments it is useful to describe the 
duties as if the virtual property were real, were owned by the game player, 
and were in the possession of a bailee game company.  Such a bailment 
would arguably benefit both parties.  The game company benefits by 
attracting the game player, and the game player benefits by having the 
virtual property sustained by the game company.  Therefore, the game 
company would either owe a duty of ordinary and reasonable care under 
the classification system or, equivalently, reasonable care under the 
circumstances.  One might be able to generally map the duty of reasonable 
care to the proposed default rights to bits in context discussed herein.   
 
[63] A duty of reasonable care could inform an analysis of unjust 
devaluation or destruction.  In the example above, if MindArk devalues 
Mr. Jacobs’ $100,000 space station by creating a new, habitable moon, 
then the court could look to whether MindArk acted with reasonable care.  
The test for reasonable care might parallel the tests for good cause and 
good faith, discussed above, by assessing whether MindArk’s actions were 
                                                          
136 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 57 (2005). 
137 Koennecke v. Waxwing Cedar Prods., Ltd., 543 P.2d 669, 673 (Or. 1975) (noting that 
“a substantial number of jurisdictions have completely abandoned the concept of 
divisibility of diligence and negligence into degrees and, consequently, apply only one 
standard of care, that of the ordinary prudent men (sic) under the particular 
circumstances.”) (citations omitted).  Accord Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 529-
30 (Colo. 1982) (citations omitted). 
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reasonable or whether they followed the spirit of the original bargain.  If 
MindArk acted with reasonable care, then MindArk’s actions should be 
allowed, and it should not be required to compensate Mr. Jacobs.  
Otherwise, MindArk should have to compensate Mr. Jacobs.  Considering 
the examples of destruction of bits in context, the protection of Li 
Hongchen’s virtual arsenal from destruction caused by negligence138 
should clearly be within the reasonable care owed by Artic Ice in a 
mutually beneficial bailment.  On the other hand, the loss of virtual 
property due to a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, is arguably outside 
a game provider’s duty of reasonable care. 
 
[64] Whereas the doctrines of good cause, good faith, and the reasonable 
care of bailees might not identically inform an assessment of unjustified 
partial devaluation of bits in context, each does provide a familiar 
doctrinal basis for constructing such a balance of the rights to bits in 
context.  This still leaves an important question to be answered: should 
courts consider the extent of devaluation?  The next section looks to 
regulatory takings in order to find what might be appropriate doctrinal 
parallels to address that question. 
 
3. DESTRUCTION AND EFFECTIVE TOTAL DEVALUATION: LOOKING TO 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
 
[65] One area of law to which courts can look when deciding whether a 
particular change constitutes a total devaluation of virtual property and 
whether destruction or devaluation of virtual property should be 
compensated is regulatory takings.  Regulatory takings occur when 
regulations or laws change, thereby changing the value of personal 
property.139  If an owner sacrifices all economically beneficial use, she has 
                                                          
138 See supra note 119. 
139 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1992). Whereas the 
government does have a right to change regulations and laws concerning property. 
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986).  If the regulation 
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 480 U.S. 470 (1987).  Additionally, 
complete devaluation is permitted to avoid a nuisance.  Kelo v. City of New London, 125 
S.Ct. 2655 (U.S. 2005).  There is arguably no parallel to nuisance abatement in the virtual 
property context.   
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suffered a taking.140  On the other hand, a taking is less readily found 
when the law or regulation is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life141 or when the regulation advances a legitimate government 
interest and does not take all economic benefit from the owner.142  
 
[66] A court might draw upon the regulatory takings doctrine to help 
determine the outcome in a case in which a game company attempts to 
“balance” its game.  Consider an example in which the game company 
alters a game to make particular virtual armor less powerful and thereby 
less valuable.  Depending on the facts of the case, a court could interpret 
this change as balancing the benefits (e.g., protection from virtual attacks 
by other characters) and burdens (e.g., difficulty for other characters to 
successfully hurt or damage the character wearing the virtual armor) 
within the game, and therefore not a taking.  If particular virtual armor is 
too powerful, then the benefits and burdens of virtual life may too strongly 
favor the owners of the virtual armor.  This is precisely what game 
companies are attempting to correct when they balance the game and thus 
change the value of virtual property.  Balancing these benefits and burdens 
might be seen as a permitted devaluation – a permitted change in context.   
 
[67] A change within a game, such as the balancing of the virtual armor, 
might also be seen as advancing a legitimate interest of the game company 
and, therefore, as a permitted change in context.  In particular, the game 
company has a legitimate interest in keeping the game fair and enjoyable 
for all game players.  If one player’s character is effectively invincible 
because of a particular set of virtual armor, then the game will become less 
enjoyable for all players who engage in virtual battles with that character.  
Notwithstanding the owner’s increased enjoyment due to invincibility, the 
aggregate enjoyment within the game, however that may be measured, is 
likely to be lower.  Maintaining players’ aggregate enjoyment of the game 
is certainly a legitimate interest of the game company.  Hence, the 
                                                          
140 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
141 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 n.18 (1987) 
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
142 Long Cove Club Assoc. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 458 S.E.2d 757, 758 (S.C. 
1995). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
39 
company might have a right to balance the game by making the armor less 
powerful, even if that takes some value from the owners of the armor.   
 
[68] On the other hand, if virtual property or the game is changed such 
that the virtual property becomes effectively valueless or useless, or if 
virtual property is deleted or destroyed, then a court might find that the 
change is equivalent to a taking and therefore is prohibited.  In the virtual 
armor example, if the game is changed such that the virtual armor no 
longer protects the player’s character from the virtual attacks of other 
characters, the armor becomes so weak that it is valueless, or the armor is 
deleted from the user’s inventory, then a court might find that the change 
took all benefit from the virtual property owner.  The court might rule that, 
whether or not the bits still exist in the context of the game, the change is 
effectively a prohibited destruction of bits in context. 
 
[69] There are likely other doctrines from which courts might draw upon 
to help with the fine distinctions between permitted and prohibited 
devaluation and destruction of virtual property.  This paper discusses a 
few useful doctrines which can provide some guidance to courts: duties of 
bailees, good cause, good faith, and takings.  The doctrines could be used 
separately or in combination.  For example, a court might find liability 
whenever a game company acts in a way that devalues (or destroys) a 
game player’s virtual property if that action: a) was not performed in good 
faith or was not for good cause or b) undermines all economically 
beneficial use of the virtual property, regardless of whether there was good 
cause or whether the game company was acting in good faith.  Given that 
such a doctrinal choice would not put a threshold on the level of 
devaluation needed for potential fault, liability might exist even in the 
most mundane cases.  Perhaps a more reasonable doctrinal choice would 
view undermining all economically beneficial use as a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for liability.  If that threshold were met by destruction 
or devaluation of the virtual property, then the court could look to whether 
the changes were made for good cause and in good faith.  This doctrinal 
choice would reduce the breadth of liability to only the cases most 
important to game players – those in which virtual property has become 
effectively valueless.   
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B. THE PERMITTED DESTRUCTION OF CONTEXT 
 
[70] Seemingly to the contrary of the previous section, where I argued that 
bits should be protected from unjust destruction or devaluation, here I 
argue that virtual property should not be protected in instances where it is 
the context, and not the bits in context, that is being destroyed.  That is, 
game players should not be protected when it is the game, and not their 
virtual property within the game, that is being destroyed.  To address this 
issue, I look first at whether game companies should be forced to continue 
to operate games in which players own virtual property.  I then discuss 
whether game companies should be required to compensate game players 
when a game, and thereby their virtual property within the game, is 
destroyed.  Finally, I look at whether destruction of context should be 
permitted for other reasons. 
 
[71] When addressing the wholesale destruction of virtual property that 
had existed in the context of a terminated game, there are a number of 
reasons why a court might not award specific performance (forcing a 
game company to continue to offer a game after it has made a decision to 
terminate).  A game company is arguably in the best position to decide 
when continuation of a game is a net economic benefit, and it has the 
incentive to continue games that provide net economic benefits.  As such, 
if a court is concerned about maximizing economic benefit, then it should 
arguably not force a company to continue providing a game after it has 
made a decision to terminate.  Additionally, forcing the game company to 
continue providing the game would violate the company’s right to 
terminate the game as it sees fit.143  Forcing game companies to continue 
providing games could also implicate a Peevyhouse v. Garland analysis, 
whereby a court can award diminution in market value to a contractee in 
cases where specific performance would cost more than the worth of the 
                                                          
143 See Pittsburgh Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 491 U.S. 490, 507 
(1989) (citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) (noting 
that a company has an absolute right to terminate its business)).  On the other hand, one 
might argue that termination of a game is a precluded termination of part of a business 
unit, if the company provided other games.  Textile Workers, 380 U.S. at 268.  However, 
it might be unreasonable for a company’s right to terminate a game to turn on whether the 
company provides other games. 
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performance to the recipient.144  The cost to the game company of 
maintaining the virtual property could greatly outweigh the benefit to the 
game player.145  Therefore, in those cases, a court should not award 
specific performance.146    
 
[72] Furthermore, if courts could force game companies to continue 
providing games, then the cost of providing games would increase and the 
price game players paid would reflect this increase in risk and burden on 
the game companies.  One should question whether game players are 
willing to pay for this type of “insurance.”  If players do not want this 
specific performance insurance, then, based on the factors noted above, 
courts might not force game companies to continue to provide games, 
irrespective of the loss of virtual property.  
 
[73] There is an open question, however, as to whether game companies 
should compensate game players for their lost virtual property.  If courts 
forced game companies to compensate game players for the worth of 
destroyed virtual property when terminating a game, based on 
                                                          
144 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).  
145 Supra note 143. 
146 If a game is a net monetary drain on society, then a game company should arguably 
not be enjoined from terminating the game.  If a game is losing money and the net present 
value (NPV) of the losses is larger than the aggregate value of the virtual property, then 
discontinuing the game will be a net benefit to society, notwithstanding the loss of virtual 
property.  Arguably the net present value of the virtual property should be weighed 
against the net present value of the game company’s losses.  Given the difficulty of 
determining even the present value of virtual property, let alone the potential future value 
of virtual property discounted to today’s dollars, I use aggregate virtual property 
valuation as a first approximation.  If the game company will profit on the game or if the 
NPV of any losses is less than the value of the virtual property, then society will lose out 
economically by terminating the particular game.  There may be more to the situation, 
however.  It is likely that the game company is trying to increase its profits in the long 
run and that a different game would be more profitable: NPV (current game) < NPV 
(future game).  The cost or benefit to society of the change from one game to another is 
based on whether [NPV (new game) + new game virtual property value ] > [NPV (old 
game) +  old game virtual property value].  If we assume that the worth of virtual 
property in the new and old games is similar, then the game company will always be 
working toward a higher value to society. 
For a discussion of the NPV method, see JAMES D. EDWARDS, ET. AL., HOW ACCOUNTING 
WORKS 331-332 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1983).  
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Peevyhouse, for example, then there might be problems valuing the virtual 
property.  First, basing valuation on the market prices for virtual items 
might be the only reasonable, pragmatic approach.147  Even market price, 
however, might not provide a complete picture.  Many items, especially 
common ones owned or easily found by most players, will not be 
priceable if they have never been sold.  These items might individually be 
of minimal real-world value due to their large supply but might have much 
aggregate value.  Furthermore, extremely rare items which are never sold 
may be unpriceable but might have much value.148  Given the uncertainty 
in market value, game companies who would be acting as insurers of the 
virtual property would not only increase the price charged to game players 
to reflect known market values of virtual property, but would also increase 
prices to reflect the risk of potentially large compensation for virtual 
property of unknown value.  Again, one might question whether this is the 
type of insurance for which the game players are willing to pay.   
 
[74] Perhaps it would be better for game players, upon destruction of their 
virtual property, to get equivalent amounts of virtual property in a 
different game provided by the same game company.  This would be ideal 
insomuch as it would allow an exchange of virtual goods that might pass 
little to no insurance costs to players.149  Such an exchange, however, is 
still infected with problems of valuation.  It is arguably impossible to 
determine the relative value of a virtual item in one game in terms of 
virtual items in another game.150  One might consider using real-world 
market price as an exchange-rate intermediary.  This approach, however, 
would suffer the same incompleteness of market information as did the 
                                                          
147 Market price could be based on actual sales.  See, e.g., EDWARD CASTRONOVA, 
SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE GAMES 2 (University of 
Chicago Press) (2005); see also supra notes 7, 14. 
148 In UBISoft’s Shadowbane, for example, players can build “guilds,” which are cities 
with membership.  Shadowbane, http://chronicle.ubi.com/Guilds.php (last visited Dec. 
18, 2006).  Each guild is created by the players in the game and is unique.  It may be 
impossible to price any particular one. 
149 Since MindArk sells virtual property, replacing destroyed virtual property with virtual 
property in a different game may be tantamount to paying a monetary compensation 
award.  See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
150 For example, is a particular sword in Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft. 
(World of Warcraft, supra note 2), equivalent to a sword, or anything else, in Blizzard’s 
Diablo II (Blizzard Entertainment -- Diablo II,  http://www.blizzard.com/diablo2 (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2006))?   
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compensation scheme discussed above. But where information is available 
and where no insurance cost would be passed on to the players, it may be a 
reasonable way to attempt to make players whole again.151 
 
[75] Even if players were willing to pay the “insurance” price for virtual 
property, or if game companies could compensate the loss of virtual 
property in one game with the grant of virtual property in another game, 
we still might not want to compensate virtual property owners for 
termination of the game in which their virtual property lies.  In contrast to 
the arguments made for protection of bits in context, the termination of a 
game is arguably within the reasonable expectations of game players when 
they sign up for a game.  Most players would expect to play a game and 
keep virtual property as long as the game is around – not after the game 
company has decided to terminate the game.  The company is likely to 
hold the same view.  Both the players and the game companies know that 
there is a risk that providing a game will become costly and, when that 
happens, that the game will be discontinued.  If the contracting parties had 
a “meeting of the minds” about the potential for discontinuation of the 
game at the time the user signed up, then the game player should not be 
able to receive a windfall when that foreseen condition arises.152 
 
[76] Furthermore, when it comes to protecting virtual property in the 
context of a continuing game, it seems rational to favor the rights of the 
consumer (the game player).  When it comes to addressing the termination 
of particular games, it seems rational to favor the actors in the gaming 
industry (the game companies).  Game companies are in the best position 
to promote and grow the gaming industry and will suffer any economic 
                                                          
151 One would still have to address what happens when a game company does not offer 
any other online games. 
152 Furthermore any reasonable care, good faith, and good cause duties owed by the game 
company might all be met.  The game company would have presumably been doing its 
best to keep the game running and profitable.  Presumably the game company acted in 
good faith and with reasonable care in attempting to keep its game as profitable as 
possible.  Additionally, as noted above, there would arguably be good cause, or at least 
economic rationality, if the game company decided to terminate a game.  In total, the 
game company will protect the context, the game, as best it can.   If a situation arises in 
which the game company was not acting in good faith or did not have a good reason to 
terminate the game, then perhaps compensation or specific performance would be 
justified. 
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hardships that result from ill-advised game terminations.  Allowing game 
companies to freely terminate games, perhaps without compensating the 
virtual property owners, follows this intuition. 
 
[77] The previous sections describe a theory of virtual property that is both 
truer to the underlying technology and better represents parties’ 
expectations than other currently available theories.  The next section 
addresses the issue of remedies, and what should be available to game 
players when a game company fails to uphold a duty with respect to 
virtual property. 
 
C. REMEDIES 
 
[78] Above, I argue that there should be no remedy for termination of a 
game.  There remains an open question, however, of what remedy should 
follow a prohibited destruction or devaluation of bits in context.  I argue in 
this section that the remedy for prohibited destruction of virtual property 
should be replacement of the virtual property.  I then discuss the options 
for remedying the prohibited devaluation of bits in context. 
 
[79] The remedy for destruction of virtual property should be replacement 
of the bits in the context of the game.  That is, in addition to any related 
civil or criminal charges based on fraud or theft (e.g., one might charge the 
hacker from Arctic Ice with theft or destruction of property), the legal 
system should attempt to replace virtual property and to avoid providing 
monetary equivalents.  Replacement of the virtual property, as opposed to 
providing a monetary equivalent, allows the court to avoid determining the 
real-world value of virtual property.  As discussed above, determining 
real-world value of virtual property may be an intractable task153 and one 
for which a court might be ill-equipped.  Furthermore, replacement of 
destroyed virtual property should have minimal cost.154 
 
                                                          
153 See note 149 and accompanying text. 
154 Since virtual property in the context of a continued game can be replaced by 
appropriately placing integers in the game’s database (supra notes 109-111, 114 and 
accompanying text) the game company will bear only a minimal administrative cost for 
restoring the virtual property. 
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[80] Only in cases where replacement is impossible should other 
compensation for the destroyed virtual property be considered.  This may 
not be a common scenario for online games.  However, in some online 
games, such as Linden Lab’s Second Life,155 it is possible to create 
potentially irreplaceable virtual property.  Users of Second Life can write 
computer programs that represent buildings, vehicles, weapons, games, 
and almost anything else that the mind can imagine.  If such virtual 
property were destroyed, and no backup or record usable to reconstruct the 
virtual property existed, then replacement of the virtual property would 
effectively be impossible.  In such a case, it might be appropriate to 
provide another form of compensation, such as those discussed below, for 
compensating devalued virtual property. 
 
[81] For prohibited devaluation of virtual property, “replacement” of the 
virtual property would be ideal.  Restoring the value of unjustly devalued 
virtual property would consist of reverting the game, the context, back to 
how it was before the devaluation.156  For example, this might consist of 
restoring properties of unjustly devalued virtual armor or swords.  In other 
cases, this replacement or restoration might not be possible.  Consider the 
arguably unjust devaluation hypothetical considered above wherein 
MindArk gave away space stations to every player immediately after 
selling one to Mr. Jacobs for $100,000.  Restoring the value of Mr. 
Jacobs’ space station would consist of destroying all of the space stations 
that MindArk had given away.  Such destruction would contravene the 
rights of the other space station owners.   
 
[82] Where restoration is not possible, monetary damages or equivalent 
virtual property might be acceptable compensation.  If MindArk began 
giving away space stations in Project Entropia after selling one to Mr. 
Jacobs, then Mr. Jacobs’ space station would also be valued at or near zero 
dollars.  Therefore, an appropriate award for Mr. Jacobs could be the 
previous value of the space station, $100,000.  As noted, above, however, 
perhaps courts should avoid awarding monetary damages when possible.  
                                                          
155 Second Life: Your World, Your Imagination, http://secondlife.com (last visited Dec. 
18, 2006). 
156 See supra section IV.A. 
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Avoidable monetary damages unduly increase the cost that consumers will 
be charged to play games and could stifle the gaming industry. 
 
[83] Instead of providing game players with monetary compensation, it 
may be preferable, where possible, to replace virtual property in a 
particular game with equivalently-valued virtual property in that same 
game.  Since items are often traded in-game and because virtual items in 
the same game are often sold in the real-world market, it should be easier 
to find equivalent virtual property within the same game than in the inter-
game scenario considered above.157  Consider a situation where Blizzard 
Entertainment unjustly and completely devalued a virtual sword in the 
game World of Warcraft.  If the virtual sword had been commonly 
exchanged in-game among players for a particular set of virtual armor or 
for a particular amount of virtual currency, then Blizzard could arguably 
make the player whole again by giving the player the virtual currency or 
the virtual armor.  In this way, compensation would be set by the virtual 
market and the game company would not act as insurers of the virtual 
property.158 
 
[84] Game players who have suffered unjust devaluation of virtual 
property might be made whole again by restoring the game to its previous 
state, providing monetary compensation, or providing equivalent virtual 
goods.  None of the solutions is perfect for every situation.  Therefore, 
determining a remedy will depend on the information and solutions 
available in each case.   
                                                          
157 If the players of the particular game value two virtual items in that game equivalently, 
then perhaps a court should also.  This is in contrast to the issue discussed above with 
respect to game termination.  It is arguably harder to justify equating virtual property in 
two different games.  Supra note 152. 
158 This would not be the case for MindArk and Project Entropia.  Blizzard does not sell 
virtual items for World of Warcraft.  Therefore, when replacing one virtual item with 
another virtual item, Blizzard bears nothing more than an administrative cost.  MindArk, 
on the other hand, sells the virtual items to the players.  If MindArk is forced to replace 
one item of virtual property with another, then MindArk is arguably losing out on the sale 
of the later virtual property.  For example, if MindArk were to give Mr. Jacobs $100,000 
worth of virtual property in exchange for unjustly and completely devaluing his virtual 
space station, then MindArk is arguably giving away $100,000 in virtual property that it 
could have otherwise sold.  For MindArk such virtual-property-for-virtual-property 
exchange might be tantamount to a monetary damage award. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
[85] This paper proposes that the protection afforded to the “owners” of 
virtual property should be based on a conceptualization of bits in context.  
The numbers representing the bits, the underlying physical server on 
which the bits are stored, and the electronic database in which the bits are 
located would, at best, provide obscuring or confusing bases for the 
formulation of default rights for virtual property.  The bits-in-context 
theory provides a more coherent formulation for the rights of the game 
players and game companies.  Furthermore, although the game player 
should have rights to virtual property within the game for as long as the 
game exists – regardless of whether the game player found or purchased 
the virtual property, game companies should be free to discontinue games, 
thereby destroying the context of the bits.   
 
[86] Virtual property represents an economic interest that is clearly 
valuable to those who buy, sell, trade, and use it.  The market in virtual 
property, and society in general, will be better served with legal 
protection.  For example, at the margin, the protection of virtual property 
may reduce crime.  Whereas adequate legal protection might not have 
stopped one game player’s murder of another when the latter sold the 
former’s virtual sword,159 it might prevent similar crimes.  If the users 
know that there is a legal regime to protect their virtual property interests, 
then at least some of the users will avoid crime and choose legal 
enforcement instead. 
 
[87] The role of virtual property as discussed herein is limited to 
ownership of assets and characters within multi-user, persistent online 
games.  The issues addressed, however, may not be so limited.  As virtual 
environments become more ubiquitous and are used in a broader range of 
commercial and social enterprises, the types of virtual property will 
expand and may include artistic, scientific, and other creations that we, as 
                                                          
159 Sale of Virtual Weapon Leads to a Murder, CANBERRA TIMES (Australia), Apr. 4, 
2005 , at A17 (noting that “Qiu Chengwei, 41, stabbed competitor Zhu Caoyuan 
repeatedly in the chest after he was told Zhu had sold his ‘dragon saber’, used in the 
popular online game Legend of Mir 3”). 
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a society, will value more than we do mere online gaming-related virtual 
property.160  As such, it is important that we establish default rules and 
legal precedents that provide the kind of protection we will want in the 
future. 
 
 
 
                                                          
160 The bits-in-context theory may apply to other current issues.  Email addresses or 
universal resource locators (URLs), for example, may warrant protection only in certain 
contexts.  When we consider protection for email addresses, for example, we would 
usually consider the ability to receive email as a protectable element.  That is, we would 
not want one person to be able to use another’s email address to receive email.  We may 
also want to protect an email address from use by a third party as a return address – often 
called “email spoofing.”  In order to protect these two uses of the bits representing the 
email address, we must protect them in the context of use as a routing mechanism.  If one 
were to illicitly receive email using another’s email address, then they would be using 
those bits in the context of message routing – the protected context for email addresses.  
If we choose to also protect people from email spoofing, then we would be protecting the 
use of the email address again in the context of message routing.   
